Abstract-This paper considers the joint design of training and data transmission in physical-layer secret communications, and examines the role of artificial noise (AN) in both of these phases. In particular, AN in the training phase is used to prevent the eavesdropper from obtaining accurate channel state information (CSI), whereas AN in the data transmission phase can be used to mask the transmission of confidential messages. By considering AN-assisted training and secrecy beamforming, we first derive bounds on the achievable secrecy rate and utilize them to obtain approximate secrecy rate expressions that are asymptotically tight at high SNR. By maximizing these expressions, power allocation policies between signal and AN in both training and data transmission phases are then proposed for conventional and AN-assisted training-based schemes, respectively. We show that the optimal AN power at high SNR should be non-vanishing with respect to the total power, and that AN usage can be more effective in the training phase than in the data transmission phase when the coherence time is large. However, at low SNR, we show that AN cannot be effectively utilized due to the lack of accurate CSI, and thus, one can often do better without. Numerical results are presented to verify our theoretical claims.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I
NFORMATION-THEORETIC secrecy has received renewed interest in recent years, especially in the context of wireless communications, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium and the increasing amount of confidential data that is being transmitted over the air. Most studies in this area stem from the seminal works by Wyner in [1] and by Csiszar and Korner in [2] , where the secrecy capacity was characterized for degraded and nondegraded discrete T.-Y. Liu was with the Institute of Communications Engineering, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 30013, Taiwan. He is now with Realtek Semiconductor Corporation, Hsinchu 30076, Taiwan (email: tyliu@erdos.ee.nthu.edu.tw).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2016.2620281 memoryless wiretap channels (i.e., channels consisting of a source, a destination, and a passive eavesdropper), respectively. In particular, secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable secrecy rate between the source and the destination subject to a constraint on the information attainable by the eavesdropper. These issues were also examined for Gaussian channels by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman in [3] , where Gaussian signalling was shown to be optimal. These works showed that the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel increases with the difference between the channel quality at the destination and that at the eavesdropper.
In recent years, studies of the wiretap channel were also extended to multi-antenna wireless systems, e.g., in [4] - [8] , where the secrecy capacity or its upper and lower bounds were derived under different channel assumptions, and several techniques were proposed to best utilize the available spatial degrees of freedom. More specifically, the work in [4] focused on the multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel and showed that transmit beamforming with Gaussian signalling is optimal. However, perfect knowledge of both the main and the eavesdropper channel state information (CSI) was required at the source in order to determine the optimal beamformer. In [5] - [8] , more general results were obtained for cases with multiple antennas at the destination, and precoding techniques were developed under similar CSI assumptions. On the other hand, when the eavesdropper CSI is unavailable at the source, which is often the case in practice, the secrecy capacity and its corresponding optimal transmission scheme are unknown. In this case, an artificial noise (AN) assisted secrecy beamforming scheme, where data is beamformed towards the destination and AN is placed in the null space of the main channel to disrupt the eavesdropper's reception, is often adopted and was in fact shown to be asymptotically optimal in [4] . Even though knowledge of the eavesdropper channel is not required in this scheme, perfect knowledge of the main channel CSI is still needed, which can also be unrealistic due to noise in the channel estimation.
In practice, CSI is typically obtained through training and channel estimation at the destination. In conventional systems (without secrecy constraints), training signal designs have been studied for both single-user and multiuser systems in [9] - [11] , respectively. In these cases, it is customary to apply training in the forward direction where pilot signals are sent from the source to enable channel estimation at the destination. The channel estimate can then be fed back to the source from the destination (if needed). However, this approach may not be favorable under secrecy considerations since the emission of pilot signals by the source also facilitates channel estimation 1556-6013 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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at the eavesdropper (and, thus, enhances its ability to intercept the source's message). Motivated by this observation, a secrecy-enhancing training scheme, called the discriminatory channel estimation (DCE) scheme, was proposed in [12] and [13] , where AN is super-imposed on top of the pilot signal in the training phase to disrupt the channel estimation at the eavesdropper. However, the training signal designs were obtained by only taking into consideration channel estimation performance measures and constraints. The impact on the achievable secrecy rate in the data transmission phase was not considered. The main objective of this work is to examine the impact of both conventional and AN-assisted (i.e., DCE) training on the achievable secrecy rate of AN-assisted secrecy beamforming schemes. Different from previous works in the literature that focus on either training or data transmission, we consider the joint design of the two, and examine the role of AN in both of these phases. In this work, the two-way DCE scheme [13] is employed in the training phase to prevent CSI leakage to the eavesdropper, and the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme is used in the data transmission phase to mask the transmission of the confidential message. We first derive bounds on the achievable secrecy rate of these schemes, which are shown to be asymptotically tight as the transmit power increases, and utilize them to obtain closed-form approximations of the achievable secrecy rate. By maximizing the approximate secrecy rate expressions, power allocation policies between pilot, data, and AN in both phases are proposed respectively for systems employing conventional and AN-assisted training schemes. We show that the optimal AN power should be non-vanishing with respect to the total power at high SNR and that AN usage can be more effective in the training phase than in the data transmission, especially when the coherence time is long. However, in the low SNR regime, we show that the use of AN is less effective (and is actually undesirable) due to the lack of CSI. In fact, allocating resources for training is strictly suboptimal in this regime and noncoherent transmission schemes can often do better. Numerical results are provided to verify our theoretical claims. While many of our results are derived based on the training and data transmission schemes adopted in this paper, they provide useful practical insights on the tradeoff between training and data transmission, and on the use of AN in both phases.
The joint design of training and data transmission was investigated for point-to-point and multiuser scenarios (without secrecy constraints) in [14] and [15] . However, different from these works, finding a good approximation of the achievable secrecy rate under imperfect CSI, and coping with the nonGaussianity caused by the combination of AN and channel estimation errors can be challenging in our case. Similar issues were discussed more recently in the context of secret communications in [16] . However, in their work, perfect CSI was assumed to be available at the eavesdropper regardless of the training strategy and, thus, no AN was needed in the training phase. Our work is also related to [17] - [19] , where the impact of channel estimation errors and limited feedback were examined for secrecy scenarios. However, these works focused on the achievable secrecy rate for given estimation error statistics without considering the cost of training. CSI at the eavesdropper was also often assumed in these works to simplify the analysis of the eavesdropper's performance. A preliminary study of our work was presented in [20] for the case of conventional training. The current work provides full proofs of all theoretical claims, extends the studies to the case of AN-assisted training, and examines the low SNR case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a general training-based transmission scheme is introduced and, in Section III, bounds on the achievable secrecy rate are derived. In Sections IV and V, closedform secrecy rate expressions and power allocation policies are proposed for cases with conventional and DCE training, respectively. The analysis of the secrecy rate in the low SNR regime is discussed in Section VI. Finally, numerical results are provided in Section VII, and a conclusion is given in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Let us consider a wireless secret communication system that consists of a source, a destination, and an eavesdropper, as in Fig. 1 . The source has n t antennas while both the destination and the eavesdropper have only a single antenna each. The main and eavesdropper channels (i.e., the channel from the source to the destination and to the eavesdropper, respectively) can be described by the vectors h = [h 1 , . . . , h n t ] t and g = [g 1 , . . . , g n t ] t , respectively, where the entries are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with mean 0 variances σ 2 h and σ 2 g , respectively (i.e., CN (0, σ 2 h ) and CN (0, σ 2 g )), and (·) t denotes the matrix transpose. We consider a block fading scenario where the channel vectors remain constant over a coherence interval of duration T , but vary independently from block to block. By adopting a training-based transmission scheme, each coherence interval is divided into a training phase with duration T t and a data transmission phase with duration T d , as illustrated in Fig. 1 . In the training phase, pilot signals are emitted by the source (and/or the destination) to enable channel estimation at the destination (and/or the source, respectively); and, in the data transmission phase, confidential messages are transmitted utilizing the estimated channel obtained in the previous phase. Following methods proposed in [12] and [13] for training and in [21] for data transmission, AN is utilized in the respective phases to degrade the reception at the eavesdropper. Our goal is thus to jointly determine the optimal power allocation between signal and AN in both of these two phases.
A. Training Phase
In conventional point-to-point systems, training is typically performed by having the source emit pilot signals to enable channel estimation at the destination. Most works in the literature on physical layer secrecy, e.g., [4] , [21] - [23] , inherit such an assumption and, thus, assume that the eavesdropper can also benefit from the pilot transmission and can obtain a channel estimate that is no worse than the destination. Interestingly, it has been shown more recently in [12] and [13] that secrecy can be further enhanced by embedding AN in the pilot signal to degrade the channel estimation performance at the eavesdropper. By doing so, the difference between the effective channel qualities experienced by the destination and the eavesdropper can be enhanced and, thus, a higher secrecy rate can be achieved. Here, we adopt the two-way discriminatory channel estimation (DCE) scheme proposed in [13] , where training is performed in two stages, i.e., the reverse and the forward training stages. In the reverse training stage, a pure pilot signal is sent in the reverse direction by the destination to enable channel estimation at the source; in the forward training stage, a pilot signal masked by AN is emitted by the source to facilitate channel estimation at the destination while preventing reliable reception at the eavesdropper. By assuming that the channel is reciprocal, that is, the reverse channel can be represented as the transpose of the forward channel vector, i.e., h t , estimation of the reverse channel provides the source with information about the forward channel.
Let T r and T f be the length of the reverse and the forward training stages, respectively, and thus the total training length is T t = T r + T f . In the reverse training stage, the pilot signal s r ∈ C T r ×1 with s † r s r = T r is first emitted by the destination, and is received at the source as
where P r is the pilot signal power in the reverse training stage, h t is the channel vector from the destination to the source, and V r ∈ C T r ×n t is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrix with entries that are i.i.d.
Following the procedures given in [13] , the source first computes the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate h of the channel h based on s r . The resulting channel estimation error is h r = h − h, where the variance of each component is given by
Then, in the forward training stage, the source emits a training signal with AN placed in the null space of the estimated forward channel h, which is given by
where 
where v f and w f are the AWGN with entries that are i.i.d. CN (0, σ 2 ). The destination and the eavesdropper are then able to compute linear MMSE estimatesĥ andĝ of their respective channels. The channel estimation error vectors are h h−ĥ and g g −ĝ, whose entries are 0 mean with variances
and
respectively. The channel estimateĥ is fed back to the source at the end of the training phase for use in the data transmission. In the DCE scheme described above, reverse training is first performed to provide the source with knowledge of the channel between itself and the destination (but does not help the eavesdropper obtain information about its channel from the source). This knowledge is then used by the source to determine the AN placement in the forward training stage so as to minimize its interference at the destination. In conventional training, only the forward training stage is required since AN is not utilized. In this case, the training length is T t = T f (since T r = 0) and the forward training signal can be expressed simply as X f = P f S f . Even though the time required for conventional training is less than that of DCE (leaving more channel uses for data transmission in each coherence interval), the achievable secrecy rate may not necessarily be higher due to increased CSI leakage [23] to the eavesdropper.
B. Data Transmission Phase
Suppose that the source is able to obtain knowledge of the channel estimateĥ through feedback from the destination but has only statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel g (and alsoĝ). Based on this channel knowledge, the source can then utilize in the data transmission phase an AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme [21] where the data-bearing signal is directed towards the destination while AN is placed in the null space ofĥ to jam the reception at the eavesdropper. The transmit signal is thus given by
where
is the data-bearing signal vector whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, 1), P d is the power of the data signal, Nĥ ∈ C (n t −1)×n t is the matrix that spans the null space ofĥ and satisfies NĥN † h = I n t −1 , and
is the AN matrix whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, P a n t −1 ). Hence, the total AN power in the data transmission phase is P a .
The received signals at the destination and eavesdropper are
where v d ∼ CN (0, σ 2 I) and w d ∼ CN (0, σ 2 I) are the AWGN vectors. The signal and AN powers in both training and data transmission should satisfy the total power constraint
III. BOUNDS ON THE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE UNDER CHANNEL ESTIMATION ERRORS
In this section, we derive bounds on the achievable secrecy rate of the training-based secrecy transmission scheme described in the previous section. The secrecy capacity of wiretap channels with imperfect CSI is unknown in general. However, the bounds derived in this section are asymptotically tight at high SNR and can be used to determine the joint power allocation and AN usage in training and data transmission.
Let us consider a (2 nT R , nT ) wiretap code that spans over the data transmission phases of n coherence intervals. The code consists of an encoder φ n that maps the message W ∈ W {1, 2, ..., 2 nT R } to a length-n block codeword s n d and a decoder ψ n that maps the received signal y n d into the message estimateŴ ∈ W at the destination. A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nT R , nT ) codes such that the average error probability at the destination goes to zero, i.e., P (n) e 1 2 nT R w∈W Pr(Ŵ = w| W = w) → 0, and the equivocation rate converges to the average conditional entropy of W , i.e., R
is the channel output at the eavesdropper over n coherence intervals, andĥ n ,ĝ n are the corresponding estimated channel vectors at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively.
Following the results in [2] , an achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme with imperfect CSI can be written as
Here, we make the practical assumption that all users compute their channel estimates and utilize them for data detection. 
Here,
are normalized channel estimates whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, 1).
Notice that h and g are normalized so that they are independent of the power allocation, i.e., P r , P f , P f a , P d , and P a .
Details of the proof can be found in Appendix A. This theorem shows that the achievable secrecy rate can be bounded in the neighborhood ofR when both the channel estimation error and AN terms are effectively Gaussian. The upper and lower bounds are analogous to those derived in [14] and [24] for conventional point-to-point channels. However, different from [14] and [24] , the proof of our theorem requires n t to be large in order for the product between the estimation error and AN to be approximately Gaussian. Yet, in practice, n t need not be large in order for the Gaussian assumption to hold (c.f. Fig. 6 of Appendix A). The bounds in Theorem 1 are applicable regardless of the training scheme as long as h and g are Gaussian. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The bounds in Theorem 1 hold when either conventional or AN-assisted training (i.e., DCE) schemes with linear MMSE estimation is adopted in the training phase.
The corollary can be shown as follows. In the conventional training scheme, no AN interference exists in the received forward training signals in (4) and (5) and, thus, the estimation error h (and also g) is indeed Gaussian and independent ofĥ when employing the linear MMSE estimation (which is also the optimal MMSE estimation in this case) [25] . However, this is not the case in AN-assisted training since the AN interference A f Nh h r in (4) is non-Gaussian. Yet, by applying Lemma 1 in Appendix A, we can also show that A f Nh h r is asymptotically Gaussian as n t → ∞ since h r is again Gaussian as a result of the MMSE estimation at the source. These bounds are utilized in Sections IV and V to examine the tradeoff between pilot and data transmission in cases with conventional and AN-assisted training, respectively.
IV. AN-ASSISTED SECRECY BEAMFORMING WITH CONVENTIONAL TRAINING IN THE HIGH SNR REGIME
In this section, we first consider the case where AN is only applied in the data transmission phase. We first derive an approximate secrecy rate expression based on the bounds given in Theorem 1, and use it to determine the optimal power allocation between the pilot signal in the training phase and the data and AN in the data transmission phase.
A. Asymptotic Approximation of the Achievable Secrecy Rate
In conventional training (i.e., in the case where AN is not utilized in the training phase), no reverse training is needed and the forward training signal can be written as X f = P f S f . Here, the training length is set equal to the number of transmit antennas, i.e., T t = T f = n t , which is known to be optimal for conventional point-to-point systems without secrecy constraints [14] . Even though the optimality of T t = T f = n t has not yet been proven in the literature for wiretap channels, we believe that this is a reasonable choice since T f = n t is the minimum number of observations that the destination needs in order to obtain a reasonable estimate of the n t unknown channel coefficients. In fact, setting T f < n t makes the channel unresolvable, even in the noiseless case. Increasing the training length T f beyond n t only reduces the number of channel uses in the data transmission phase and incurs a significant loss in secrecy rate at high SNR. The received signals at the destination and the eavesdropper in the training phase can be written similarly as in (4) and (5), excluding the terms corresponding to A f . By employing MMSE estimation, the channel estimation error variances in (6) and (7) 
respectively. The signal model in the data transmission phase also remains the same as in (8), (10) , and (12) . Let us denote the achievable secrecy rate in the conventional training case by R conv . Then, by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we know that
whereR conv , R
conv , and R (u) conv are given by (16) , (17) , and (18) with σ 2 h and σ 2 g given above.
, P * a (P)) be the optimal power allocation (i.e., the power allocation that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate R conv ) under total power constraint P. To derive the optimal power allocation, it is often necessary to obtain an explicit expression of the achievable secrecy rate, which is difficult to do in this case. However, we show in the following Theorem 2 that the achievable secrecy rate under P * (P), i.e., R conv (P * (P)), can be closely approximated bỹ R conv (P * (P)), for P sufficiently large.
In the following, we say that two functions f and g are asymptotically equivalent (denoted by f .
The maximum achievable secrecy rate R conv (P * ) under conventional training is asymptotically equivalent toR conv (P * ) (i.e., R conv (P * )
.
Moreover, we can show that, to achieve the maximum achievable secrecy rate, the powers assigned to all components, including the pilot in the training phase and the data and AN in the data transmission phase, should scale at least linearly with P (i.e., should not vanish with respect to P as P → ∞).
The proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix B. Notice that, due to the total power constraint in (13) , no power component can increase faster than O(P). Therefore, by Corollary 2, all power components should scale exactly linearly with P. In this case, the channel estimation error variances under P * can be written as
This follows from the fact that
by the total power constraint and P * f (P) = (P) by Corollary 2. Notice that the approximate secrecy rate given in (20) strictly increases with P * f , which implies that one can always achieve a higher secrecy rate by increasing the power used for training. This is because the increase of training power benefits the destination by reducing both channel estimation error and AN interference; whereas only the channel estimation error is reduced at the eavesdropper. Therefore, the total power constraint should be satisfied with equality at the optimal point, i.e., P
In fact, for any > 0 and for n t sufficiently large, it can be further shown that
The derivations can be found in Appendix C. This lower bound provides an explicit description of the relationship between the achievable secrecy rate and the power of each component.
B. Power Allocation Among Training and Data Transmission
In this subsection, we examine the power allocation between pilot, data, and AN in the conventional training case with the goal of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate. However, instead of using R conv (whose expression is unknown) as the objective function, we propose a power allocation policy based on the maximization of the lower bound of the approximate achievable secrecy rate given in (21) .
First, let us set
since the total power constraint must be satisfied with equality. Then, by removing all the terms that are irrelevant to the optimization and by the fact that the logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, the power allocation problem can be formulated as
where P f , P d , and
By taking the first-order derivative of J conv and setting it to zero, we obtain the solution
The optimality of the solution can be further verified by showing that the Hessian matrix at the point (P * f ,P * d ) is negative semi-definite [27] . The resulting power allocation policy can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1: The power allocation that maximizes the approximate secrecy rate expression in (21) is
The effectiveness of this solution compared to the optimal power allocation P * (i.e., the one that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate R conv ) will be verified numerically in Section VII. This solution indicates that, with conventional training, the ratio between the energy used for training and that for data transmission, i.e.,P
Recall that T f is equal to n t whereas T d increases with the coherence time. Hence, as the coherence time increases, more energy should be allocated to the data transmission phase to support the increasing number of channel uses. Moreover, we can also see from Proposition 1 that equal power should be allocated to data and AN in the data transmission phase. It is interesting to observe that the solution does not depend on the channel variances σ 2 h and σ 2 g since, for P sufficiently large, the AWGN terms are negligible and, thus, the SNR at both the destination and the eavesdropper are determined by the ratio between their own received data and AN powers, which actually experience the same channel. Furthermore, by (20) , we can observe that the achievable secrecy rate increases without bound as P increases. However, this is not always the case when AN is utilized in neither training nor data transmission as to be shown in our simulations. This implies that AN is necessary (at least in the data transmission phase) to achieve a secrecy rate that increases without bound with respect to P. However, when the coherence time is large, the energy allocated to training becomes negligible and almost half of the total energy is allocated to AN in the data transmission phase (according to Proposition 1). That is, only half of the energy is left to transmit the actual message. However, if AN can be further applied in the training phase, the difference between the effective channel qualities at the destination and at the eavesdropper can be enhanced, even before the data is actually transmitted. The proportion of AN needed in the data transmission phase can then be reduced. This is discussed in the following section.
V. AN-ASSISTED SECRECY BEAMFORMING WITH AN-ASSISTED TRAINING IN THE HIGH SNR REGIME
In this section, we extend our discussions to the case where AN is used in both the training and the data transmission phases. This refers to the DCE and the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming schemes described in Sections II-A and II-B, respectively. We first derive an approximate achievable secrecy rate expression and utilize it to determine the power allocation between pilot, data, and AN in both phases.
A. Asymptotic Approximation of the Achievable Secrecy Rate
Following Section II, let the reverse and the forward training lengths be equal to the number of antennas at the destination and the source, respectively. That is, we set T r = 1 and T f = n t . Moreover, let R DCE be the achievable secrecy rate of the system considered in this section. By Theorem 1, we can also obtain upper and lower bounds of R DCE as
where the terms are given by (16) , (17), and (18) with σ 2 h and σ 2 g given by (6) and (7).
, P * d , P * a ) be the optimal power allocation that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate R DCE . In this case, we can also show that R DCE (P * ) is closely approximated byR DCE (P * ), for P sufficiently large.
Theorem 3: The maximum achievable secrecy rate R DCE (P * ) under DCE training is asymptotically equivalent toR DCE (P * ) (i.e., R DCE (P * )
. =R DCE (P * )) as P → ∞. The scaling of the optimal power allocation can also be derived as follows.
Corollary 3: P * f (P) = (P) and P * d (P) = (P), and that either P * f a
The proofs can be found in Appendix D. The corollary shows that, to achieve the maximum achievable secrecy rate, the power allocated to the forward pilot signal in the training phase and the message-bearing signal in the data transmission phase, i.e., P * f (P) and P * d (P), should both increase linearly with P, and so should the power of at least one of the AN terms (either in the training or data transmission phases, or both). Moreover, the reverse training power P * r (P) should scale at least as fast as the AN power P * f a (P) in the training phase. This is because, with larger AN power P * f a (P), more power should be invested in reverse training to ensure more accurate placement of AN in the forward training stage.
By Corollary 3, the channel estimation error variances in (6) and (7) can be written as
since P * r (P) = (P * f a (P)) and P * f (P) = (P), and (26) respectively. Notice that, in (26), the ratio
does not scale as fast as P * f . Hence, for P sufficiently large, the achievable secrecy rate can be approximated as
Following similar procedures as in Appendix C and by Corollary 3, we can show that, for any > 0 and for n t sufficiently large, the second term in (27) can be approximated as
in (27) ) and the event A c Nĥg 2 /(n t −1)−1 > . Then, by further applying Jensen's inequality to (28), we obtain the following lower bound onR DCE :
It is worthwhile to note that, in this case, the length of the data transmission phase is T d = T − T r − T f , which is different from that in the conventional training case (c.f. Section IV).
B. Power Allocation Among Training and Data Transmission
Similar to Section IV, our proposed power allocation policy for the DCE case is also derived by maximizing the lower bound ofR DCE given in (29) . In particular, by letting
the optimization problem can be formulated as
Notice that the approximate secrecy rate expression in (29) follows from Corollary 3 where it was shown that at least one of the two AN powers (either P * f a (P) or P * a (P), or both) scales linearly with P. However, by the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix D, we know that the same asymptotic secrecy rate can also be achieved by having all power components P r , P f , P f a , P d , and P a scale linearly with P. In this case, the objective function can be further approximated as
are respectively the numerator and the denominator ofJ DCE . Moreover, in (30), the total power constraint is written with an equality in (30c) since the objective function increases monotonically with respect to P r (regardless of whether J DCE orJ DCE is considered). This is because the increase of the reverse training power does not benefit the eavesdropper and can be set as large as possible. However, this problem is nonconvex and, thus, is difficult to solve efficiently. To obtain an efficient solution for this problem, we adopt a successive convex approximation 
a ) and a convergence threshold 0 > 0. Set iteration number i := 0. 2: repeat 3: i := i + 1 and set ξ (i)
, and ξ (i)
(SCA) approach where the original problem is converted into a sequence of geometric programming (GP) problems using the monomial approximation and the condensation method, similar to that done in [12] and [28] . In the following, we describe the procedures of the SCA algorithm briefly using J DCE as the objective function. The same can be done with J DCE as well. Further details can be found in [12] and [28] . For convenience, let us consider equivalently the minimization of the reciprocal of the objective function, i.e., 1/J DCE . Notice that the denominator of 1/J DCE is a posynomial function that can be lower-bounded as
for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ξ 3 ≥ 0, where the right-hand-side is a monomial function. By substituting this term with its monomial lower bound in (32), we obtain a standard GP problem that is solvable in polynomial time. In the SCA algorithm, this is done iteratively until the solution converges. In particular, suppose that (P
) is the solution obtained in the (i − 1)-th iteration. Then, in the i -th iteration, the denominator of 1/J DCE is replaced by the monomial function
where ξ (i) 1
. The algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a stationary point of the problem [28] . The procedures are summarized in Algorithm 1 and the resulting solution is denoted byP
Notice that, in Algorithm 1, power allocation is obtained by solving a sequence of GP problems, where each problem involves only five parameters, namely, P r , P f , P f a , P d , and P a . The GP in each iteration can be solved by using a standard barrier-based interior-point method [29] , which has a worst-case polynomial-time complexity. However, the problem size remains fixed for all scenarios (even as the number of transmit antenna increases) and, thus, there is no scalability issue here. On the other hand, the average number of iterations required for convergence depends on the choice of the convergence threshold 0 . In particular, for 0 = 10 −4 , which is the value adopted in our simulations, the average number of iterations required is 20 (c.f., Section VII). This value does not vary significantly for different SNRs. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that the power allocation considered in this work is obtained by maximizing the achievable ergodic secrecy rate, which is averaged over the statistics of the channel. Hence, only the channel variances, i.e., σ 2 h and σ 2 g , are required to derive the objective J DCE in (30) and compute the power allocation. These parameters need not be updated unless the statistics of the channel changes, e.g., when the locations of the users changes significantly. The feedback overhead is much lower than power allocation schemes that rely on instantaneous CSI [30] , [31] . In practice, the values of σ 2 h and σ 2 g can be obtained by having the destination and the eavesdropper observe the channel over a sufficient amount of time and feedback the estimated variances back to the source (or alternatively by having the source estimate the distances between itself and the two receivers). If the eavesdropper does not participate in the CSI feedback, σ 2 g can be chosen based on the anticipated worst-case location of the eavesdropper.
C. Comparison With the Conventional Training Case
It is worthwhile to remark that, compared to the conventional training scheme in the previous section, the DCE scheme requires an additional symbol period in the training phase for reverse training. This results in a smaller pre-log factor and, thus, a significant loss in secrecy rate at high SNR. However, we can show that can always achieve a higher secrecy rate as long as the coherence time is sufficiently long.
Corollary 4: LetP * conv be the solution given in Proposition 1. Then, for P and n t sufficiently large, there exists
The proof can be found in Appendix E. The intuition behind Corollary 4 is that, with DCE training, the effective channel qualities at the destination and the eavesdropper are already well-discriminated in the training phase and thus a larger portion of energy can be allocated to data rather than AN in the data transmission. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of the DCE scheme increases faster than that of conventional training as the coherence time increases. Note that Corollary 4 provides only a sufficient condition on the coherence time T .
The advantage of DCE can actually be observed for much smaller values of T as shown in our simulations.
VI. SECRECY RATE IN THE LOW SNR REGIME
In this section, we examine the achievable secrecy rate and the corresponding optimal power allocation in the low SNR regime, i.e., in the case where σ 2 → ∞. Here, T f can be chosen arbitrarily (and need not be limited to n t as in the high SNR scenario).
Let u r (ĥ) (10)). Then, we have
. Following similar derivations, we can also obtain
by a factor of n t due to the processing gain provided by transmit beamforming. By combining the above, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4: In the low SNR regime, the achievable secrecy rate of the training-based transmission scheme considered in Section II is
(37) Notice that the above secrecy rate does not depend on the AN power P a in the data transmission phase, and that σ 2 h → σ 2 h and σ 2 g → σ 2 g as σ 2 → ∞ regardless of the AN power P f a in the training phase. Hence, the same asymptotic secrecy rate can be achieved even without the use of AN and, thus, all power can be allocated to the transmission of either the pilot or the data signals. However, it should be noted that the secrecy rate in (37) decays as 1/σ 4 which is much worse than that achievable when the noncoherent transmission scheme, previously proposed in [33] for conventional pointto-point channels (without secrecy constraints), is employed. In fact, by directly applying the transmission scheme in [33] to the wiretap channel model under consideration, we can achieve a secrecy rate that decays only as 1/σ 2 . This shows that one can actually do better without training in the low SNR regime.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify numerically our theoretical claims and compare the achievable secrecy rates of different training and power allocation schemes. Unless mentioned otherwise, the number of antennas at the source is n t = 16, the coherence interval is T = 480, the forward training length is T f = 16, and the reverse training length is T r = 1 (when considering the DCE scheme). The transmit SNR is defined as P/σ 2 and the channel variances are σ 2 h = σ 2 g = 0.5. In Fig. 2 , we show the approximate achievable secrecy rateR conv (P * conv ) of the conventional training case witĥ P * conv being the proposed power allocation given in Proposition 1 (labeled as "R conv (Proposed)") and compare it with the maximum value max PRconv (P) obtained via exhaustive search (i.e., "R conv (Exhaustive)") as well as with the rate obtained under equal power allocation (i.e., "R conv (Equal)"). The upper and lower bounds obtained from Theorem 1 for the conventional training case (i.e.,R conv (P) + R (u)
conv (P)) are also plotted for comparison. These bounds are optimized respectively via exhaustive search. The upper bound with equal power allocation is also shown. We can see that the approximate solution given in Proposition 1 is indeed near optimal at high SNR and yields about 4 dB improvement over the case with equal power allocation (i.e., "R conv (Equal)"). In fact, a 2 dB improvement is still observed when comparing with the upper bound of the equal power allocation case (i.e., "R conv (P) + R (u) conv (P) (Equal)"). Moreover, by comparingR conv (P * conv ) with the optimized upper and lower bounds in Theorem 1, i.e., max
conv (Exhaustive)"), we can see that the approximate secrecy rateR conv (P * conv ) indeed closely approximates the maximum achievable secrecy rate R conv (P * conv ) (i.e., Theorem 2), where P * conv is the power allocation that maximizes R conv , since max
conv (P)} at high SNR, as shown in Fig. 2 . In this figure, the lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate derived in [18] is also plotted for comparison. This lower bound was derived by assuming that the eavesdropper is noiseless and has perfect knowledge of the channel vectors h and g. In [18] , the impact of imperfect mainchannel CSIĥ on the achievable secrecy rate was examined for a given estimation error variance σ 2 h , without regard of the training scheme or the cost required for training. For comparison with our work, we substituted the estimation error variance in [18] with that obtained from conventional training by setting P f = P d . The power allocation between AN and data transmission is set to be equal, i.e., P d = P a , as proposed in [18] . We can see that this lower bound is substantially looser than our proposed bound due to the ideal assumptions at the eavesdropper.
In Fig. 3 , we show the approximate achievable secrecy rateR DCE (P * DCE ) of the DCE training case withP * DCE being the proposed solution obtained by Algorithm 1 (i.e. "R DCE (Proposed)") and compare it with the maximum value max PRDCE (P) obtained via exhaustive search (i.e., "R DCE (Exhaustive)"). The optimized upper and lower bounds obtained from Theorem 1 for the case with DCE training (i.e.,R DCE (P) + R (u)
DCE (P)), and the upper bound with equal power allocation are also plotted for comparison. Again, the secrecy rate obtained with the proposed solution rapidly converges towards that obtained via exhaustive search as the transmit SNR increases. 7 dB and 5 dB improvements are respectively observed over the case with equal power allocation and its corresponding upper bound. Moreover, since the optimized upper and lower bounds max P {R DCE (P)+ R (u) DCE (P)} and max P {R DCE (P)− R (l) DCE (P)} (c.f., Theorem 1) maintains a constant difference as the transmit SNR increases and, by Fig. 3 ,R DCE (P * DCE ) stays between the two bounds, it follows that the difference between the approximate and the actual rates, i.e., R DCE (P * DCE ) − R DCE (P * DCE ), where P * DCE is the power allocation that maximizes R DCE , becomes negligible compared to R DCE (P * DCE ). The lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate derived in [18] is also plotted here for comparison.
In Fig. 4 , we compare the (approximate) achievable secrecy rates of the different training-based transmission schemes considered in this work, namely, the case with conventional training, the case with DCE training, and the case where no AN is used in either training or data transmission. Moreover, we also plot the achievable secrecy rate of three ideal cases: (i) the case with perfect CSI at the transmitter and the receivers (i.e., CSIT and CSIR), that is, the case where the CSI at all terminals are perfectly obtained without estimation error [4] ; (ii) the case with perfect main-channel CSIT and perfect CSIR using AN (i.e., the case where the source knows only the CSI between itself and the destination, and uses AN in the data transmission phase to disrupt the reception at the eavesdropper) [21] ; and (iii) the case with perfect main-channel CSIT and perfect CSIR but no use of AN in the data transmission. Recall that T d = T − T f − T r where T r is equal to 1 in the case with DCE training and is 0 otherwise. For the ideal cases mentioned above, the time needed for training is still taken into account (even though the estimate is assumed to be perfect in these scenarios), but the training power is neglected (i.e., all the power is used for data transmission). We can see that the secrecy rates achieved with perfect CSIT and CSIR [4] are the largest among all other schemes since, in this case, the source can perfectly beamform the data signal towards a direction that maximizes the difference in mutual information between the main and the eavesdropper channels. However, in the case with perfect main-channel CSIT and perfect CSIR using AN [21] , the achievable secrecy rate can actually be worse than that obtained with AN-assisted training (i.e., "R DCE (Proposed)"), where the CSI is imperfect due to channel estimation errors. This is because, by using AN in the training phase, the quality of the CSI at the eavesdropper can be intentionally reduced to enhance the discrepancy between the effective SNRs at the two receivers. This implies that, instead of focusing on improving the channel estimates at the receivers, it is actually more important to devote resources to enlarge the difference between the CSI quality at the destination and the eavesdropper. Moreover, we can see that, when AN is used in neither training nor data transmission, the achievable secrecy rate does not increase without bound as the transmit SNR increases and, in fact, converges to that of the case with perfect main-channel CSIT and perfect CSIR with no AN as its channel estimates become more accurate. The fact that the achievable secrecy rate is bounded in this case indicates that the use of AN is essential to achieve good secrecy rate performance in the high SNR regime.
In Fig. 5 , we verify the effect of coherence time on the achievable secrecy rate of the different schemes. Here, the transmit SNR is fixed at 30 dB. The DCE scheme with suboptimal power allocation refers to the power allocation used to prove the sufficient condition in Corollary 4. The suboptimal solution performs significantly worse than the proposed solution, but was sufficient to yield the condition in Corollary 4. In fact, with the proposed power allocation, DCE is able to outperform conventional training with a coherence time of only 70, which is considerably smaller than the value 250 required by the suboptimal power allocation. Yet, the latter is still smaller than the value 358.25 predicted by Corollary 4, where the result is more conservative. Moreover, by comparing the curves corresponding to "R DCE (Proposed)" and "R conv (Proposed)", we can also see that the advantage of utilizing AN in the training phase increases as the coherence time increases. In fact, the case with DCE training (i.e., "R DCE (Proposed)") even outperforms the case with perfect main-channel CSIT and CSIR using AN [21] when the coherence interval is sufficiently large. This is because, by employing AN in the training phase, the difference between the CSI quality at the destination and that at the eavesdropper can be increased before data is transmitted. Then, in the data transmission phase, less energy can be allocated to AN for disrupting the eavesdropper's reception, and more energy can be used to transmit the actual message-bearing signal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the impact of both conventional and AN-assisted training on the achievable secrecy rate of the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme. Bounds on the achievable secrecy rate were first derived and then utilized to obtain a closed-form approximation that is shown to be asymptotically tight at high SNR. The approximate expression was then adopted as the objective function to determine the power allocation between pilot signals, data signals, and AN in both training and data transmission phases. An asymptotically optimal closed-form solution was obtained for the case with conventional training whereas a successive convex approximation approach was proposed for the case with DCE training. Furthermore, in the low SNR regime, we showed that AN provides no gains in secrecy rate and, thus, is not needed in either training or data transmission. Numerical simulations were provided to verify the tightness of the bounds and the advantages of DCE over conventional training. 
APPENDIX
e., the LMMSE of s d given y d while assuming thatĥ is known), we have
where (41) follows from Jensen's inequality. Next, to obtain the upper bound, we instead write
We know that h(
since Gaussian maximizes entropy, and h( 
h , for i = k, and 0, otherwise. Then, it follows by central limit theorem that the i -th entry of vector AN h = Ab, i.e., Even though Lemma 1 requires n → ∞, the value of n need not be large for the Gaussian approximation to be valid in practice. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 6 , it is sufficient to have n ≥ 4 in order for AN h to have a distribution that is close to Gaussian. In this figure, the variances of both the real and the imaginary parts of AN h are set to 1. Only the distribution of the real part is plotted for comparison.
By Lemma 1 (with n = n t , t = T d , and P = P a ), we know that A d Nĥ h is asymptotically Gaussian as n t → ∞ if h is Gaussian as well. Hence, for n t sufficiently large, we have
Similarly, for g that is Gaussian and n t that is sufficiently large, we can also show that 
Hence, to obtain Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that
conv (P * ), and lim P→∞ R (u) conv (P * )/R conv (P * ) = 0. Specifically, with P l , the channel estimation error variances can be expressed as
where c 1
is a finite constant that is independent of P. Similarly, we can also show that R (l)
Moreover, by (16) and (17), and by choosing a constant k such that k P ≥ max{P d , P a , σ 2 }, we havẽ
where c 2 1 (17)). Thus, we can writẽ
where c 2
conv (P * ). By combining (51) and (56), we obtain the desired result
R conv (P * ) = 0, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof of the corollary relies on the fact that
for any linear power allocation P l . Specifically, let us first consider the upper bound
where (a) is obtained by eliminating the negative terms iñ R conv (P) and by lower-bounding the denominator of the first term by σ 2 , and (b) follows from Jensen's inequality. By the argument below (54), we know that
, and thus, R (u) conv (P * ) = O (1) . Then, together with (57) and (51), we have
. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate can be upper-bounded as
where c 3 =
conv (P * ) is a finite constant and (a) holds since P * d σ 2 g = O(1) and P * a σ 2 g = O (1) . Since the second term in (63) must be finite (otherwise (63) would be smaller than (51)), we have P * a (P) = (P * d (P)) which implies that P * a (P) = (P).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF (21) IN SECTION IV
By the weak law of large numbers (WLLN), we know that Nĥg 2 n t −1 → 1 in probability as n t → ∞. That is, for any > 0, we have Pr(A ) → 1 (and, thus, Pr(A c ) → 0) as n t → ∞, where A Nĥg 2 n t −1 − 1 ≤ . Therefore, for n t sufficiently large, the second term in (20) 
where n t E log 1 +
Nĥg 2 (n t −1)
A c Pr A c . Notice that n t → 0 as n t → ∞ since the conditional expectation term is finite. Then, by Jensen's inequality, we have
Finally, by (20) and (67), we obtain (21).
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3 AND COROLLARY 3
A. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is an extension of the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B and, thus, is explained more concisely in the following.
Specifically, let P l (P r,l , P f,l , P f a ,l , P d,l , P a,l ) = (α r P, α f P, α f a P, β d P, β a P), where α r , α f , α f a , β d , and β a are positive constants chosen such that the total power constraint in (13) 
B. Proof of Corollary 3
The proofs of P * f (P) = (P) and P * d (P) = (P) are the same as those in Appendix B for the case with conventional training. Hence, we prove here that either P * f a (P) = (P) or P * a (P) = (P), and that P * r (P) = (P * f a (P)). (P) = (P) or P * a (P) = (P), let us rewrite the upper bound of the achievable secrecy rate as
In the above, we know that E log 1 + P * d σ 2 h h 2 = log P * d + O (1) and that R (u) (1) . Then, by the fact thatR DCE (P * ) + R (u)
T log P + O (1) , it follows that the second term in (71) must be O (1) . By substituting σ 2 g with (7) and using T f = n t , the term inside the logarithm of the second term can be written more explicitly as Since P * f (P) = (P) and P * d (P) = (P), it is necessary to have either P * a (P) = (P) or P * f a (P) = (P) (or both) in order for this term to scale as O (1) . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
To distinguish between the conventional and the DCE cases, let us denote the power allocation in the conventional case by P = (P f , P d , P a ) and that in the DCE case by Q = (Q r , Q f a , Q f , Q d , Q a ). The approximate achievable secrecy rateR conv (P * ) is given by (20) and the corresponding power allocationP * in the conventional case is in Proposition 1.
First, similar to before, by WLLN, the expectation inside the second term of (20) 
